ROLE OF CORPORATE BOARD EXECUTIVE PAY
DECISIONS IN PRECIPITATING FINANCIAL CRISIS
ERICA BEECHER-MONAS*
The focus of this essay is the role of unbridled executive pay in exacerbating
the effects of what Keynes termed the “animal spirits” of the market.1 By now, we
are all intimately familiar with the effects of turbulence in our credit markets. What
is less well understood is how we got into this mess in the first place. Leveraged
loans, “high-risk, floating-rate loans arranged by banks, syndicated through nonbank
lenders like pension, hedge, and private equity funds, and used to finance leveraged
restructuring,”2 and the feedback loop between market and firm liquidity are now
thought to be a major factor. The development of a secondary market for these
credit derivatives vastly changed what Frank Portnoy and David Skeel referred to as
the “landscape of corporate governance.”3
Financial institutions selling second-level securitizations misperceived the
risk; senior managers, investors, and regulators all thought these instruments were
riskless.4 When the bottom fell out of the market for structured investment products
based on housing finance, that also affected business finance more broadly, causing
the demand for leveraged loans to drop sharply and “reducing credit access for
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private equity firms and other borrowers seeking to finance leveraged buyouts.”5 As
Alan Schwartz, President and C.E.O. of Bear Stearns, explained to the U.S. Senate
Banking Committee, rumors about Bear’s illiquidity caused its liquidity cushion to
fall precipitously as “customers withdrew cash and repo6 counterparties increasingly
refused to lend against even high-quality collateral.”7 Ultimately, the crisis in investor
confidence in the “structured securities markets led to risks flowing onto banks’
balance sheets”8 and into our current financial crisis.
So what does all of this have to do with executive pay? Surely I am not going
to blame the entire financial crisis on exorbitant pay? Bear with me.
In most firms, the point of aligning shareholder interests with those of senior
managers through the use of compensation structures like stock options is to
encourage managerial risk-taking. Stock options are meant to align the interests of
management with that of shareholders, since executives will only exercise the options
if the market price of the stock exceeds the exercise price, giving managers an
incentive to maximize shareholder value. Thus, pay for performance is intended to
correlate the firm’s productivity with managerial compensation.9
Moreover, herding effects mean that CEOs have incentives to “ride a bubble
until [just before] it bursts,”10continuing to engage in risky structured-financing
transactions, even if they have doubts about the soundness of the strategy, since
otherwise they risk losing out on substantial short-term profits. The higher the
compensation, and the more closely it is tied to the price of the firm’s stock, the
5
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greater the incentive to ride that bubble. And if the CEO fails to jump off in time,
there’s always his golden parachute.
Moreover, stock-based compensation is a double-edged sword, giving
managers an incentive not only to increase production effort, but also to increase the
diversion of firm assets.11 The ability of managers to choose the timing of their
stock sales and sell large amounts of stock over a short time period presents the
dilemma of giving managers the incentive to manipulate the stock price before
selling.12 The options misdating scandals that preceded the financial meltdown –
both backdating and springloading – amounted to stealth compensation.13 Why play
dating games if the CEOs are really performing? Narayanan, Schipani, and Seyhun
demonstrate that the revelation of backdating results in an average loss to
shareholders of about seven percent, translating to $400 million per firm, while
executives gain from these manipulations an average of $500,000 per firm per year,
demonstrating inefficient compensation and incorrect incentives.14 Although SOX
was supposed to curtail this abuse by requiring disclosure of option grants within
two days of the grant, Narayanan, Schipani, and Seyhun contend that it has not had
the desired effect because a significant number of firms making grants of over
500,000 options delayed reporting. The authors suggest that the best way to limit
this practice is to require companies to report both the date that the board or
compensation committee finalized the award details and the grant date that it
decided.15
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Furthermore, despite the rhetoric of pay for performance, there appears to
be little effort to adjust pay downward for poor performance. The departures of
Stanley O’Neal from Merrill Lynch and Charles Prince from Citigroup with
munificent separation packages, including the vesting of equity grants, are more
emblematic of pay for failure than of pay for performance.16 Bank of America,
recognizing that its CEO, Kenneth Lewis, missed performance goals in 2007, cut his
bonus to $8.5 million from the target bonus of $18.5 million.17 That does not
include his $1.5 million base salary or $3 million in options awards.18 At Morgan
Stanley, although the CEO did not get a bonus, the firm’s overall compensation and
benefits expenses rose 18% in 2007 despite a six percent decrease in revenue.19 On
the eve of its government-sponsored (and funded) takeover by Bank of America,
Merrill Lynch’s board awarded $3.6 billion in incentive bonuses.20 All of this rising
pay – all theoretically linked to performance – occurred within a heartbeat of the
current financial implosion, implicating each of these firms.
And the outrage over stupendous executive pay following the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) does not seem to have stopped the feeding frenzy.
Citi paid $5.33 billion in bonuses in 2008, despite losing $27.7 billion and receiving
$45 billion in the bailout.21 Bank of America, a recipient of $45 billion from TARP,
paid out $3.3 billion in bonuses.22
As a result of the short-term focus on pay period rather than long-term
results, as well as the heavy use of stock options in paying executives, the upside
potential for profits became unlinked to the risk of loss. Linking pay to short-term
gains through options appears to magnify the risk that executives are willing to take,
since they are compensated for stock price increases, but – unlike shareholders –
market price on the day of the grant, and second by explicitly requiring disclsoure in the
Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) of any program, plan, or practice of coordinating
grant dates with the release of material, non-public information. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(1)(i) (2009).
16
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they are not punished for decreases in stock price. This also increases the CEO’s
incentive to increase firm leverage, which will magnify potential returns on firm
investments.23 This kind of compensation structure may threaten the safety of the
firm. As Richard Posner remarked, a “CEO cushioned against loss has an incentive
to take high risks in order to maximize the expected value of his stock options.”24
But, in financial firms, compensation structures that encourage risk-taking may
threaten the safety and soundness not only of the particular firm, but of the entire
financial system.25
Financial firms typically pay their senior managers “zero and fifty,” or 50%
of their trading profits and losses.26 Thus, it would seem that pay is already a
function of performance in these firms. However, the questions of what constitutes
performance and how it should be measured are important ones in assessing whether
risk and performance are correlated.
First, if performance is being measured by scrutinizing quarterly earnings
reports, the result will be excessive pressure to make those numbers look good. This
provides incentives to pursue short-term gains at the expense of long-term benefits.
Moreover, a short-term-pay-period focus means that the long-term consequences of
risk-taking are often overlooked. Although clawback provisions to performancebased executive pay, written into Sarbanes-Oxley in response to the previous
financial crisis involving Enron and WorldCom (among others), should have warned
compensation committees and executives about the dangers of a short-term
perspective, short-term practices continued unabated.27 Even with a clawback
provision or payouts over time to account for risk, however, super compensation
creates conflicts of interest.28
Some financial firms did attempt to take risk into account when measuring
performance.29 The risk that was being measured, however, was risk to the particular
23
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at MM. The problem with such models is that they are based on assumptions that may not be

56

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 11

firm, rather than systemic risk. Moreover, there is strong temptation to compensate
for production without taking even firm-wide risk adequately into account. More
importantly, none of these measures focuses on systemic risk.
Currently on the table, for example, is whether the Treasury Department
should allow the payment of a $100-million bonus to Andrew J. Hall, CEO of a
Citigroup subsidiary, in light of the $45-billion taxpayer bailout to Citigroup.30
Should this senior executive bear some of the financial responsibility for the parent
firm’s predicament? For a portion of the entire TARP bailout? Jeffrey Gordon
argues that financial firms’ compensation structures are so important systemically
that the board should be required to obtain independent risk management
consultants in setting compensation.31
As a result of the crisis, several steps are being taken with regard to executive
pay. TARP limits executive compensation and golden parachutes, and requires
compensation committees to take a long-term view of firm performance for those
firms accepting the government bailout. 32 On July 10, 2009, the SEC proposed
amendments to its executive compensation disclosure rules.33 The SEC is examining
“say-for-pay” provisions, permitting shareholders to advise the board on executive
compensation. British regulators recently issued rules governing bonus payments by
banks, prohibiting bonuses guaranteed for more than one year or that are several
times the banker’s salary, with penalties of fines or increased capital requirements
because such pay models are deemed to be risky.34 But whether any of these
provisions will effect meaningful change is an open question, especially in light of a
recent study showing that short-term incentives played an even bigger role in setting
executive compensation in the 2009 proxy season than they had previously.35 Longterm programs actually have been reduced.36 There are good reasons to be wary
accurate. For example, in valuing mortgage-backed securities, the model used home price escalation
assumptions based on the prior two years: the height of the housing bubble. Id. Moreover, VAR
measures only the short term; it does not measure liquidity risk. Plus, it can be gamed, especially with
credit-default swaps; because they have constant small gains and rarely have losses, the model ignores
the losses. But the losses can be huge.
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about government involvement in regulating executive pay.37 On the other hand,
public outrage over the behavior of corporate boards in setting executive pay may
make a legislative response inevitable.
This essay has raised questions that I hope to explore more fully in a later
article. What were the effects of board group dynamics on several questions relevant
to the current financial crisis? Board capture is the most prevalent explanation for
high levels of CEO pay.38 Can that also explain why boards of financial institutions
were so complacent about risky investment strategies that their firms were
undertaking? What is the effect of herding behavior on small group dynamics
engaging in risk appraisal? And what is the link between executive pay and such
strategies? Why, after Enron, did any board trust the opaque and complex financial
instruments that were at the core of the crisis? What should be done? This work is
still in its (very) early stages, and more questions that need to be explored will
doubtless arise.
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